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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Does the First Amendment prevent Congress from enacting a content-based speech
restriction that criminalizes non-obscene, sexual depictions of persons who are not real
children?
2. Does the CPPA criminalize an intolerable amount of constitutionally protected speech so
as to warrant severing those sections that tread impermissibly on First Amendment
rights?
3. Are the phrases “appears to be” and “conveys the impression” so vague as to make a
person guess about what conduct is prohibited and encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement of the Act?
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IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM 2001

JOHN ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL.,
Petitioner,
-againstTHE FREE SPEECH COALITION, ET AL.,
Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT

OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the United States Coiul of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reported at 198
F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The statute relevant to the disposition of this case, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B), (D) is set
forth in Appendix A.

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A challenge to the constitutionality of a federal statute is reviewed de novo. See
Crawford v. Lungren. 96 F.3d 380, 384 (9th Cir. 1996).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Preliminary Statement
On January 27, 1997, Respondent, The Free Speech Coalition, et al., filed a complaint in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief against Petitioner (“the Govemmenf*) by a pre-enforcement challenge to
§ 2256(8)(B) and (D) of the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (“CPPA”). (J. A. 1.) On
August 12,1997, the district court determined the CPPA constitutional and granted the
Government’s summary judgment motion. (J.A. 85.) The Free Speech Coalition appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on August 13, 1997. (J.A. 87.) The Ninth
Circuit reversed the decision of the district court, finding that Congress had established no
compelling interest served by the content-specific speech restriction and that the Act was both
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. The Free Speech Coalition, v. Reno. 198 F.3d 1083,
1095,1097 (9th Cir. 1999). The Government petitioned the Ninth Circuit for a rehearing en
banc, which it denied on July 19, 2000. The Free Speech Coalition v. Reno. 220 F.3d 1113 (9th
Cir. 2000). This Court granted the Government’s petition for certiorari on January 22,2001.
Holder, et al. v. The Free Speech Coalition 121 S.Ct. 876 (2001).
Statement of the Facts
Over the past twenty five years, Congress has attempted to enact laws to facilitate the
prosecution of persons engaged in the creation, distribution, and possession of sexually explicit
images made through the exploitation of children. The CPPA expanded upon existing child
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pornography laws, largely to combat the use of computer technology to produce artificial, sexual
images of individuals that resemble children. (J.A. 30.) The Act criminalized the production of
images which “appear to be” or “convey the impression” of minors engaged in sexually explicit
conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B), (D). This statutory language reflected a substantial shift fi'om
defining child pornography in terms of actual harm inflicted on child participants to a more
comprehensive definition which targeted the perceived negative effects of simulated or fictional
child pornography. (J.A. 39.)
Respondent, The Free Speech Coalition, is a trade association of businesses involved in
the “production, distribution, sale and presentation of non-obscene, adult-oriented materials.”
(J.A. 2,3.) Joining the Free Speech Coalition in its facial opposition to sections 2256(8)(B) and
(D) of the CPPA are Bold Type, Inc., the publisher of a book “dedicated to the education and
expression of the ideals and philosophy associated with nudism;” Jim Gingerich, a New York
artist whose paintings include landscapes and large-scale nudes; and Ron Raffaelli, a
professional photographer whose works include nude and erotic photographs. (J.A. 3.) The
actors and models depicted in Respondents* art are, and always have been, over the age of
eighteen. (J.A. 18, 20, 21, 23.) Nonetheless, out of fear of being prosecuted under the CPPA,
Respondents have refrained fi-om producing or distributing images that may appear to some
members of the adult conununity to be minors; it is this unguided self-censorship which formed
the basis of Respondents* complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. (J.A. 18,20,21,23.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The CPPA criminalizes the production of images which “appear to be*’ or “convey the
impression” of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. As such, the Act prohibits a type of
expression protected by the First Amendment, namely, sexual, non-obscene depictions of
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individuals who are not real children. This Court has excluded child pornography and obscene
speech from traditional First Amendment protection. However, the CPPA impermissibly targets
non-obscene, childless depictions of both youthful-looking adults and fictional or simulated
images that resemble children. Because this Court’s rationale for excluding child pornography
from First Amendment coverage has been the prevention of the exploitative use of children,
Congress is not free to regulate childless pornography based on its content. The justification for
placing child pornography outside the ambit of the First Amendment is undermined when no
children are utilized in the production of non-obscene, sexual images.
The CPPA is a content-specific statute, as it targets child pornography because of its
objectionable content and bans it, thereby chilling an entire category of speech. As a contentspecific speech restriction, the Act fails strict scrutiny because it is not narrowly tailored to
advance the compelling governmental interest of protecting children from physical and
psychological harm. As a complete ban on speech, the Act’s scope is not reasonably restricted tCi
an identifiable evil which Congress may legitimately target. Congress is forbidden from
regulating a person’s thoughts merely because they are perceived as distasteful; the moral
judgments of an aggressive legislature, without the support of a legitimate, child-protective
rationale, cannot and should not justify the governmental intervention into private impressions.
Because the CPPA prohibits more protected expression than is necessary to prevent the
sexually exploitative use of children, it is unconstitutionally overbroad. The Act sweeps within
its condemnation speech which the First Amendment has immunized from governmental
regulation. The threat of unlawful application of the Act is both real and substantial; numerous
artists and producers have refrained from creation and distribution of images which may
resemble children because they fear severe criminal sanctions under the CPPA.
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Moreover, the CPPA is unconstitutionally vague, violating Fifth Amendment due process
rights. The statutory language “appears to be” and “conveys the impression” fails to define the
criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that an ordinary person could understand what
conduct is prohibited. The language is so vague that both creators and viewers of erotic art will
refrain from engaging in lawful activity out of fear that potential criminal liability may hinge on
the subjective interpretations of another person. Furthermore, the CPPA encourages arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement. The Act gives law enforcement officials, prosecutors, and
juries broad discretion to assign criminal liability based on subjective impressions.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTS NON-OBSCENE, SEXUAL DEPICTIONS
OF PERSONS WHO ARE NOT REAL CHILDREN.
The United States Constitution mandates that “Congress shall make no law abridging the

freedom of speech.” U.S. Const, amend. I. The protection of generally disfavored and often
morally objectionable speech is a cardinal principal of the First Amendment; the marketplace of
ideas thrives upon the constitutional guarantee of free expression. Although this Court has
afforded child pornography limited constitutional protection, by expanding the definition of child
pornography to include images which “appear to be” or “convey the impression” of minors
engaged in sexually explicit conduct, Congress criminalized a type of expression protected by
the First Amendment. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B), (D). Congress maintains an indisputable interest
in punishing those who would physically and psychologically harm children but, by
criminalizing the production of images which depict no actual children. Congress has abused the
legislative discretion afforded by this Court to regulate child pornography. As a content-based
suppression of speech, the Act is not narrowly tailored to advance the compelling governmental
interest of preventing the sexually exploitative use of real children. As such, it cannot withstand
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strict scrutiny. Therefore, this Court should declare the Act facially violative of the First
Amendment, and sever sections 2256(8)(B) and (D), rendering the Act otherwise enforceable.
A.

The Act Restricts a Type of Expression Protected bv the First Amendment.

With the enactment of the CPPA, Congress sought to establish an entirely new category
of unprotected speech; the Act criminalizes the production of non-obscene, sexual depictions of
individuals who are not real children. Although child pornography does not enjoy First
Amendment protection, sexual images that are neither obscene nor depict actual children should
not be subject to this categorical exclusion. The First Amendment recognizes a difference
between fictional or “childless,” child pornography and actual child pornography. As the Act
pumshes not only those who would exploit children, but those who are interested merely in the
production of sexually-oriented images of persons that resemble minors, it punishes a type of
expression that this Court has traditionally afforded First Amendment protection ... nonobscene, adult pornography.
1*

The First Amendment protects “childless.” child pornography because its
production does not require the exploitative participation of real children.

In N.Y. v. Ferber. 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982), this Court denied child pornography First
Amendment protection because of the “State’s interest in ‘safeguarding the physical and
psychological well-being of a minor.’” (quoting Globe Newsp. Co. v. Super. Ct.. 457 U.S. 596,
607 (1982)). The New York statute at issue in Ferber prohibited the “use of a child in a sexual
performance'^ 458 U.S. at 750 (emphasis added). The Court held that statutes criminalizing

child pornography must limit the offense to “works that visually depict sexual conduct by
children below a specified age.” Id, at 764. Because the statute criminalized the “use” of real
children in sexual “performances,” this Court could be certain that it was upholding a law which
was aimed at the “prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children.” Id. at 757. The
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Ferber Court further limited the scope of its decision by recognizing that in situations where “a
person over the statutory age who perhaps looked younger” or a “simulation” of a minor was
depicted, such images would enjoy constitutional protection. Id at 763. In order to protect
children from the physical and psychological abuse inherent in compelled sexual performance,
this Court placed child pornography outside the ambit of First Amendment protection.
Nonetheless, as the Ninth Circuit correctly noted, “[njothing in Ferber can be said to justify the
regulation of [child pornography] other than the protection of actual children used in [it’s]
production.” Free Speech Coalition v. Reno. 198 F.3d 1083,1092 (9th Cir. 1999).
Similarly, in Osborne v. Ohio. 495 U.S. 103,109 (1990), this Court upheld a statute
outlawing the private possession of child pornography because the law was designed “to protect
the victims of child pornography” by “destroying] a market for the exploitative use of children.”
As in Ferber. the statute in Osborne criminalized only pornography featuring real children. Id. at
106-7. In Osborne, this Court justified the exclusion of child pornography from First
Amendment protection on the grounds that the statute in question protected child victims from
participation in a type of expression that is tantamount to physical and psychological child abuse.
Id. at 109. Therefore, the Osborne Court, like the Ferber Court, separated adult and child
pornography for purposes of constitutional analysis, affording child pornography no First
Amendment protection because its production requires the sexually exploitative use of real
children.
Here, the rationale underlying this Court’s categorical exclusion of child pornography
from First Amendment protection must be revisited, as the CPPA does much more than
criminalize the sexual exploitation of actual child participants. By prohibiting the generation of
images which merely “appear to be” or “convey the impression” of minors engaged in sexually
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explicit conduct, the Act criminalizes a type of expression more akin to childless pornography.
The child-protective policy rationale which supported this Court’s decisions in Ferber and
Osbome is misplaced in the arena of fictional imaging. Sections 2256(8)(B) and (D) are entirely
unrelated to the harmful effect of child pornography on child participants but, rather, target the
effect of fictional imaging on the viewer. The CPPA does not require that actual children
participate in pornographic acts for the depiction of such acts to be criminal; the mere
“impression” of minors engaged in sexual conduct renders the viewer criminally liable. When
this Court excluded child pornography from First Amendment protection, an entire category of
speech was exposed to content-specific prohibition, but the type of childless pornography
targeted by the CPPA was not within the contemplation of the Ferber and Osbome courts.
Moreover, the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits’ holdings that sections
2256(8)(B) and (D) lawfully target unprotected speech is based solely on dicta from this Court’s
decision in Osbome. U.S. v. Hilton. 167 F.3d 61, 70 (1st Cir. 1999); IJ.S. v. Fox. 248 F.3d 394,
401 (5th Cir. 2001); U.S. v. Mento. 231 F.3d 912, 918 (4th Cir. 2000); U.S. v. Acheson. 195
F.3d 645, 650 (11th Cir. 1999). In dicta, this Court briefly noted that pervasive regulation of
child pornography, in addition to protecting child participants, may be desirable to prevent
pedophiles from seducing children into sexual activity. Osbome 495 U.S. at 111. Because, in
Osbome. this Court justified its holding under the rationale of protecting the well-being of
children, the inclusion of an additional, periphery interest, also supported by that rationale,
buttressed the Court’s reasoning. Nonetheless, when no actual children are used in the creation
of pornography, all that remains is the periphery interest, which itself is not so compelling as to
justify the blanket suppression of speech. Petitioner contends that this Court, in Osbome.
implicitly approved the regulation of childless pornography, even though the statute in question
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only prohibited the nude depiction of actual minors. However, there is nothing in Osborne that
suggests that this Court approved, or even contemplated, the prohibition of sexual images that
depict no actual children. Therefore, images which “appear to be” or “convey the impression” of
minors are not child pornography for purposes of the First Amendment, and thus, should be
afforded traditional First Amendment protection.
2.

The CPPA bans constitutionally protected, non-obscene. sexual images.

Because the CPPA criminalizes the production and possession of images that cannot be
properly categorized as child pornography, the speech prohibited by the phrases “appears to be”
and “conveys the impression” is protected by the First Amendment unless it is otherwise
obscene. Although this Court has held that “obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally
protected speech or press,” the CPPA prohibits non-obscene, childless pornography. Roth v.
U.S.. 354 U.S. 476,485 (1957). By targeting images which may be wholly artificial, not because
they appeal to a prurient interest, but rather because they resemble minors, Congress has
criminalized constitutionally protected, non-obscene speech.
This Court has arrived at a three part test for determining whether speech is obscene, and
thus undeserving of First Amendment protection. The three factors to be considered are 1)
whether the average person applying contemporary community standards would find that the
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; 2) whether the work depicts or describes,
in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
3) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Miller v Cal.. 413 U.S. 15,24 (1973). Moreover, both offensiveness and an appeal to something
other than “normal, healthy sexual desires” are essential elements of obscene speech. Brocket! v.
Spokane Arcades. Inc.. 472 U.S. 491. Specifically, this Court has held that prurience may be
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constitutionally defined for the purposes of identifying obscenity as that which appeals to a
“shameful or morbid interest in sex ” Roth. 354 U.S. at 487.
The CPPA impermissibly restricts protected speech because it extends to non-obscene,
sexual expression. By criminalizing the production and possession of images which “appear to
be” minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Congress has not only undermined the childprotective policy rationales ofFerber and Osborne, but deviated from the constitutionally
established obscenity standard. The CPPA prohibits speech which is neither patently offensive
nor appeals to a “shameful or morbid interest in sex.” Roth. 354 U.S. at 487. Moreover, the
CPPA reaches material which may possess literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Therefore, the blanket prohibition of childless pornography cannot be justified on the grounds
that such speech is per se obscene.
B.

The Act is a Content-Based Restriction on Speech.

“Any restriction on speech, the application of which turns on the content of the speech, is
a content-based restriction, regardless of the motivation that lies behind it.” Boos v. Barrv. 485
U.S. 312, 335-36 (1988). Content-based regulations of speech are “presumptively invalid.”
R.A.V.

V.

City of St. Paul. 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). A law is only content-neutral if it applies

to all speech regardless of the message; content-neutral speech restrictions are those that are
“justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.” Ward v. Rock Aeainst
Racism. 491 U.S. 781,791 (1989). If a law is directed at the impact of the speech on its viewers,
it cannot be evaluated as a neutral time, place, or manner restriction. S^ Reno v. ACLU. 521
U.S. 844, 868 (1997). This Court has been reluctant to recognize the constitutional validity of
content-based speech restrictions because content discrimination “raises the specter that the
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Government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints out of the marketplace.” R.A.V..
505 U.S. at 387 (internal citations omitted).
1.

The CPPA restricts child Domo^aphv solely on the basis of its
objectionable content.

The CPPA is a content-based restriction on speech, as it is the content of an image of a
minor, or one who “appears to be a minor” engaged in sexual conduct which makes the
production of that image unlawful. “The CPPA is a quintessential content-specific statute,”
because it “expressly aims to curb a particular category of expression by singling out that type of
expression based on its content and banning it.” Hilton. 167 F.3d at 68-69. Moreover, the
legislative history of the CPPA clearly demonstrates that one of Congress’ principal motivations
in enacting the statue was to regulate the effect child pornography has on its viewers. Congress
was concerned that child pornography “whet[s] [the] appetites” and “inflames the desires” of its
viewers. S. Rep 104-358 Sec. II (4),(10)(B). Furthermore, the enactment of the CPPA was
supported by the notion that child pornography “poisons the minds and spirits of our youth ...
and debases our society as a whole.” Id at Sec. IV (A); s^ also Sec. IV (B) (commenting that
“a major part of the threat to children posed by child pornography is its effect on the viewers of
such material”). Therefore, as the Act targets and restricts expression based solely on the
perceived danger of its content, the CPPA is properly scrutinized as a content-based speech
restriction.
2.

The CPPA does not target the “secondary effects” of speech, but rather
unreasonably anticipates the impact of its content.

Moreover, the “secondary effects doctrine” does not render the Act content-neutral.
Although this Court has recognized otherwise content-based statutes as content neutral when
those laws are motivated by a desire to control the secondary effects of speech, this doctrine has
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been interpreted narrowly by this Court, and is therefore inapplicable to the facts of the present
case. In Renton v. Playtime Theaters. Inc.. 475 U.S. 41,48 (1986), this Court held that an
apparently content-specific statute could be analyzed as content-neutral if it was “justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech.” In Renton, the regulation at issue was
a city ordinance which, although applying only to a particular category of speech, adult movie
theaters, was aimed at the secondary effects of such theaters. The ordinance was directed at the
prevention of crime, maintenance of property values, and protection of residential
neighborhoods. As this Court later stated in Boos, “the ordinance in Renton did not aim at the
suppression of free speech,” as the “content of the films being shown inside the theaters was
irrelevant and was not the target of the regulation.” 485 U.S. at 320. This Court, in Boos,
concluded that “listeners’ reactions to speech are not the type of ‘secondary effects’ we referred
to in Renton.” Id. at 321.
Here, the effects that Congress was trying to eradicate were not irrelevant to the speech
itself, but rather part and parcel of its objectionable content. Although the CPPA reflects
Congress* concern with the incidental effects of child pornography, these effects cannot properly
be categorized as “secondary,” for they are the anticipated effects of the speech’s dangerous
content. For example, the Act is not targeted at pedophilia itself, but rather at speech which,
depending on a viewer’s reaction to such material, may or may not facilitate future sexual abuse.
The CPPA was intended to prevent the perceived moral, social, and psychological damage
inflicted by child pornography, thus, the objectionable content cannot be deemed irrelevant to a
more secondary Congressional purpose. The CPPA is not a neutral time, place, or manner
restriction, but rather the blanket suppression of an entire category of speech; the speech
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restriction was motivated by the perceived negative impact of the speech, thus the secondary
effects doctrine does not apply.
Finally, this Court has stated that even if an area of speech, such as child pornography,
can be regulated because of its constitutionally prescribable content, it does not mean that these
areas are “entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that they may be made the vehicles for content
discrimination unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content.” R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383-84.
Therefore, childless pornography should not be subject to the Court’s categorical exclusion of
child pornography from First Amendment protection, as its “content” is not “distinctively
proscribable.” What makes the content of child pornography proscribable is the exploitative use
of children. When no real children are depicted, the content can no longer be freely regulated,
and the general presumption against content-based speech restrictions intervenes. Therefore,
given the content-specific nature of the CPPA, this Court should apply strict scrutiny in its facial
analysis of the Act.
C.

The CPPA Does Not Survive Strict Scrutiny.

A content-based restriction on speech is subject to strict scrutiny review. Ward. 491 U.S.
at 791. This Court uses “the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or
impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content.” Turner Broad. Svs. v. FCC.
512 U.S. 622,623 (1994). As such, a content-based speech restriction is presumptively invalid
unless it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. Boos. 485 U.S. at 321.
Because the CPPA is not narrowly tailored to advance the compelling governmental interest of
preventing the sexually exploitative use of real children in the generation of pornographic
images, it does not survive strict scratiny.
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1.

Hie prohibition of sexually explicit images which do not depict actual
children is not a compelling governmental interest.
a.

This Court has identified the prevention of harm to child
participants as the underlying legislative interest in criminalizing
child pornography.

The Ferber Court expressly stated that “dejections of sexual conduct, not otherwise
obscene, which do not involve live performance or photographic or other visual reproduction of
live performances, retains First Amendment protection.” 458 U.S. at 764-65. Thus, Congress is
not free to place content-specific speech restrictions upon the production of images which do not
feature actual child “performances,” or direct child participation. Furthermore, the Ferber
Court s rationale for prohibiting child pornography rested firmly upon the identifiable legislative
interest in protecting children from the physical and psychological damage inherent in sexual
exploitation. Similarly, this Court, in Osborne, sought to protect “child victims,” under the
rationale that child pomographers permanently record the victim’s abuse.” 495 U.S. at 111.
Thus, this Court has consistently upheld the pervasive regulation of child pornography in support
of the justifiable state interest in protecting real children from tangible and immediate harm.
b.

Regulating the sexual appetites of pedophiles is not a compelling
justification for criminalizing the production of images which do
not depict actual children.

The CPPA criminalizes the anticipated sexual responses of those who view simulated or
fabricated, childless pornography. The Government contends that sexually explicit photos of
persons who “appear” to be children could be used by pedophiles to lure potential victims. This
assertion is neither supported by sufficient legislative findings, nor justified under a strict
scrutiny test. As there is no established nexus between the viewing of fabricated images of child
pornography and acts of sexual abuse committed by the viewer, the criminalization of such
images is not supported by a compelling governmental interest.
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One of the justifications advanced by Congress for its prohibition of sexual images which
“appear” to depict children is that the statute will “prevent pedophiles from using these images to
seduce children into sexual activity, and will prevent sex crimes against children.” S. Rep 104358 Sec. rV(B). Congress’ concern that fabricated pornographic images will act as a “training
manual” or “device” for pedophiles in breaking down the “resistance and inhibitions of their
victims” is not a compelling reason for regulating speech itself, especially as the speech does not
encourage criminal exploitation of children. This Court has held that even speech which
advocates criminal conduct deserves First Amendment protection provided that the
encouragement does not rise to the level of incitement. Brandenburg v. Ohio. 395 U.S. 444,44849 (1969). Furthermore, the criminalization of speech which does not involve an actual human
victim in its presentation targets a process of mental intermediation which Congress is not
authorized to regulate. Although childless child pornography could conceivably be used by
pedophiles to lure victims, the fact that speech may be later used as an instrument for criminal
activity does not justify a blanket restriction of the speech itself. For example, visual depictions
of violence could be used by criminals to coerce the participation of others in a criminal
enterprise, yet the images themselves are not inherently criminal.
c.

The eradication of images which are morally or aesthetically
objectionable is not a compelling justification for the CPPA’s
blanket speech restriction.

The First Amendment protects individuals fi'om government intrusion into their private
thoughts and impressions. Stanley v. Ga.. 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969). “[I]f the First Amendment
means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his house,
what books he may read or what films he may watch,” Id Moreover, the government “cannot
constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person’s private thoughts.”
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Stanley. 394 U.S. at 566. Although this Court, in its post- Stanley decisions, has refused to
extend First Amendment protection to child pornography, it has deliberately ayoided oyerruling
Stanley, and thus the rule forbidding goyemmental regulation of priyate impressions is
fundamentally sound. S^ Ferber. 458 U.S. at 763.
The proyisions of the Act which criminalize the production of images “which appear to
be” or “conyey the impression” of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct yiolate the rule
adyanced in Stanley. By extending the definition of child pornography to include non-obscene,
childless pornography. Congress, rather than protecting children, has attempted to legislate
morality. The contested proyisions of the CPPA are targeted at the eradication of “eyil ideas”
and, as such, do not adyance the goyemment interest which was the justification for this Court’s
rulings in Ferber and Osborne. These proyisions do not protect child yictims, but rather infiltrate
the mental processes of the artist and the yiewer. The mental impressions and sexual desires of
those who create and view non-obscene, adult pornography are protected by the First
Amendment. In evaluating the Congressional motivations underlying the enactment of the
CPPA, this Court should continue its “longstanding refusal to [punish speech] because the
speech in question may have an adverse emotional impact on the audience.” Hustler Mag.. lnc_.
V. Falwell. 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988).
2.

The Act is not narrowly-tailored to advance the compelling governmental
interest of preventing the exploitative use of actual children in
pornographic displays.

To satisfy the standards of strict scrutiny, a content-based restriction on speech such as
the CPPA must not only advance a compelling governmental interest, but must also be narrowly
tailored to attain that end. In the present case, to survive strict scrutiny. The CPPA’s
criminalization of images which “appear to be” or “convey the impression” of minors engaged in
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sexually explicit conduct, must be the least restrictive means of furthering the government’s
interest in combating the harms generated by child pornography. See Sable Commun. of Cal..
Inc. V. FCC. 492 U.S. 115,126 (1989). Although legislatures are “entitled to greater leeway in
the regulation of pornographic depictions of children,” by criminalizing sexual depictions of
persons who are not children. Congress has exposed the CPPA to the exacting standards of strict
judicial scrutiny. Ferber. 458 U.S. at 756. Because the prohibition of images which “appear to
be” or “convey the impression” of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct is not the least
restrictive means of preventing the physical and psychological abuse of children, or destroying a
market which capitalizes on such abuse, the CPPA does not survive strict scrutiny.
In Sable, this Court held that a statute's “denial of adult access to telephone messages
which are indecent but not obscene far exceeds that which is necessary to limit the access of
minors to such messages ... [and thus] does not survive constitutional scrutiny.” 492 U.S. at
131. The Sable Court warned that the statute in question was a quintessential example of
"bum[ing] the house to roast the pig." Id, (quoting Butler v. Mich., 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)).
The statute was a “complete ban” and, thus, not the least restrictive means of protecting children
from indecent telephone communications. Id, Although Congress maintains a compelling
interest in “protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors,” the statute in Sable
was “not reasonably restricted to the evil with which it [was] said to deal.” Id. at 126-27.
Here, sections 2256 (8)(A), (D) are not narrowly tailored to advance the compelling
governmental interest of protecting children from sexual exploitation and corruption. Therefore,
as in Sable, the Act is a “complete ban” and, thus not reasonably restricted to proscribable
expression. As the Ninth Circuit correctly observed, the CPPA criminalizes the production and
possession of “foul figments of creative technology that do not involve any human victim in their
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creation or in their presentation.” Free Speech. 198 F.3d at 1093. The Act is not narrowly drawn
to advance the compelling governmental interest of preventing the sexual abuse of child
participants, as a person who “appears to be” a minor may not even be an actual human being;
fictional persons, as well as yoxmg-looking adults are per se incapable of being victims of child,
sexual abuse. In its attempt to destroy the child pornography market and facilitate prosecutions,
Congress has cast its net too widely, capturing a substantial amount of constitutionally protected
speech.
II.

THE CPPA IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD AS IT PROHIBITS BOTH
UNPROTECTED CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND PROTECTED, NON-OBSCENE
DEPICTIONS OF PERSONS WHO ARE NOT REAL CHILDREN.
When a statute reaches so far as to include constitutionally protected speech, it violates

the First Amendment. Gravned v. City of Rockford. 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972). The CPPA is
precisely such a statute because it is a complete ban of both protected and unprotected speech.
More specifically, the Act prohibits both traditional child pornography and non-obscene
depictions of individuals who are not real children. Because the Act criminalizes the production
of images which “appear to be” or “convey the impression” of minors engaged in sexually
explicit conduct, it impermissibly expands the scope of the CPPA to the extent that it captures so
much protected speech as to render the Act unconstitutional. The totality of constitutionally
impermissible applications of the Act justifies severing sections 2256(8)(B) and (D), so as to
prevent protected speech from being eclipsed by the unlawful sweep of an otherwise legitimate
statute.
A.

The CPPA Prohibits An Intolerable Amount of Constitutionally Protected Speech-

A statute is overbroad when it restricts an extensive amount of constitutionally protected
speech. Hoffman Ests. v. The Flipside. Hoffinan Ests.. 455 U.S. 489. 494 ('19821. To be
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unconstitutional, a statute’s overbreadth “must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in
relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” Broadrick v. Okla.. 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973).
This Court has defined substantial overbreadth as “a realistic danger that the statute will
significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the
Court.” Members of the City Council of the City of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent 466 U.S.
789, 801 (1984).
The CPPA “criminalizes an intolerable range of constitutionally protected conduct,” and
is therefore substantially overbroad. Osborne. 495 U.S. at 112. The Act punishes non-obscene,
childless pornography that portrays youthful-looking adults and computer generated images of
persons resembling minors, as well as realistic paintings, drawings, sculptures, and cartoons. As
such, there is a “substantial danger” that the Act will “significantly compromise” First
Amendment rights, as it prohibits images which are neither obscene nor involve the sexual
exploitation of children.
1. The CPPA bans valuable speech.
In Reno v. ACLU. 521 U.S. 844, 877 (1997), this Court held that the Communications
Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) was overbroad because the terms “indecent” and “patently
offensive” included large amounts of non-pomographic material that had serious educational or
other kinds of value. This Court found that the Government was unable to carry the heavy
burden of proving that no material of social value would be covered by the CD A. Id. at 879.
Here, the terms “appears to be” and “conveys the impression” implicate vast amounts of
non-pomographic material that has serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Under
the CPPA, an erotic painting by the famed Balthus that depicts a child in what some may
perceive to be a sexually explicit pose violates the CPPA. Similarly, acclaimed films, such as
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KIDS, Traffic, and “O”. which contain scenes that depict simulated sexual intercourse between
actors portraying minors would fall within the broad sweep of the criminal statute. The Act’s
reach likewise extends to a medical textbook that portrays and discusses the sexual abuse of
children.
2. Individuals exercising their rieht to free speech are currently being restricted
by the CPPA.
The Government erroneously analogizes the CPPA to the New York statute held to be
constitutional in Ferber. 458 U.S, at 773. Ferber and this case are inapposite because the CPPA
has and will continue to restrict far more types of protected expression than the statute at issue in
Ferber. There are legal forms of artistic expression currently covered under the Act that are
being affected. Outlaw Productions, Inc., for example, an adult film company, has withheld
adult films featuring adults who appear to be younger than 18 because they fear prosecution
under the Act. (J.A. 17.) Bold Type, Inc., a group that educates people who are interested in
nudism, fear prosecution for teaching people about the freeing aspects of the nudist philosophy.
(J.A. 3.) Jim Gingerich, a well-known artist whose paintings include landscapes and large-scale
nudes, fears the possibility of being prosecuted for a painting that portrays an adult who appears
to be younger than 18. (J.A. 3.) Outlaw Productions, Bold Type, and Jim Gingerich, are only a
few examples of people who are covered under the overly broad scope of the CPPA. Under the
Act, a person who publishes a book about nudism will be placed in the same category as a person
who sexually exploits children.
Congress voiced concerns that the overly broad language of the CPPA would include
people who exercise the very rights that have been previously expressly protected. Senator
Biden, for example, cautioned that “by criminalizing all visual depictions that “appear to be”
child pornography - even if no child is ever used or harmed in its production - [the CPPA]
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prohibits the very type of depictions that the Supreme Court has explicitly held protected.” (J.A.
52.) Senator Biden’s concern has become a reality because constitutionally protected speech is
being punished under the CPPA.
B.

The CPPA’s Severability Clause Provides an Alternative to Finding the Entire
Statute Invalid on Overbreadth Grounds.

Although this Court has traditionally been reluctant to strike down a statute on its face
when the statute “marginally infringes on First Amendment values,” this Court has held that
partial invalidation of a statute is appropriate when a statute is part constitutional and part
unconstitutional. Parker v. Lew. 417 U.S. 733,760 (1974); Brockett v. Spokane Arcades. 472
U.S. 491, 501 (1985). “If the parts are wholly independent of each other, that which is
constitutional may stand while that which is unconstitutional will be rejected.

Id.

The CPPA contains a severability clause, which was specifically included to remedy the
overbreadth that may result from Sections 2256(8)(B) and 2256)(8)(D). 18 U.S.C. 2256(9);
S. Rep. No. 104-358 at 28 (1996). Congress foresaw the potential unconstitutional overbreadth
of the CPPA and included the severability clause in order to provide this Court with a less severe
alternative to complete invalidation.
The unconstitutional sections of the CPPA and the constitutional sections are wholly
independent of each other and this Court should utilize the severability clause and strike Sections
2256(8)(B) and (D). These sections transform an otherwise lawful statute into an
unconstitutional statute because they include images that do not depict actual children. By
striking these two sections, this Court will cure the CPPA of its constitutional infirmities and
enable it to serve the compelling governmental interest of protecting real children from sexual
exploitation.
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III.

THE CPPA IS VOID FOR VAGUENESS AS THE PHRASES “APPEARS TO BE”
AND “CONVEYS THE IMPRESSION” ARE HIGHLY SUBJECTIVE.
The Constitution provides that “no person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or

property without due process of law.” U.S. Const, amend. V. The CPPA is void for vagueness
because it violates the Fifth Amendment right to due process. Statutory vagueness is
unconstitutional because vague laws: 1) do not specify what type of conduct is unlawful such
that a person of ordinary intelligence can understand; 2) result in “arbitrary and discriminatory
application”; and 3) have a chilling effect on the exercise of protected speech. Gravned v. City
of Rockford. 408 U.S. 104,108-109 (1972). Sections 2256(8)(B) and (D) exemplify each of
these concerns.
A.

The CPPA Does Not Define the Criminal Offense with Sufficient Clarity Such
That an Ordinary Person Could Understand What Is Prohibited.

A statute that forces persons of common intelligence to guess at its meaning violates the
constitutional guarantee of due process. Connallv v. Gen. Constr. Co.. 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
The phrases “appears to be” and “conveys the impression” are highly subjective and provide no
guidance as to what type of conduct should be avoided so as not to fall under the scope of the
CPPA. Moreover, the Government has broad discretion to determine whether an individuaPs
impressions are criminal.
1.

The CPPA does not indicate whose perspective defines the appearance of
a minor.

The phrases “appears to be” and “conveys the impression” are highly subjective because
they do not specify from whose perspective the impressions are judged. An individual who is
looking at an image has no way of knowing whether the illegality of his conduct will be
determined solely on the basis of his own impressions or rather from the perspective of the
distributor, or even that of law enforcement officials. Similarly, it is difficult to distinguish a
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significant difference between the terms “appears to be” and “conveys the impression ” For
example, it is unclear whether an image can be found to “appear to be a minor” even if it is not
presented in such a way as to “convey the impression” that it is a minor. A criminal statute
cannot rest on an uncertain foundation that leaves the threshold of what is lawful and unlawful to
mere conjecture. Connallv. 269 U.S. at 393. A citizen should not be held criminally liable under
a statute which is subject to significantly different constructions. Id
2.

Because of its vague wording, the CPPA targets more than apparently
realistic depictions of minors.

The government contends that “appears to be” and “conveys the impression” addresses
real children. However, the language of the statute does not specifically state that it addresses
minors. Therefore, the CPPA does not limit its applications to realistic images of children.
Under the current construction of the statute, any image that a single individual decides to
interpret as a child is included under the statute. Therefore, each citizen is judged according to
the extremes of society’s interpretations, from the most conservative to the most liberal.
B.

The Vague Statutory Language Encourages Arbitrary and Discriminatory
Enforcement.

In Kolender v. Lawson, this Court held that the possibility of law enforcement officials
employing their personal beliefs poses a grave threat that must be prevented. There must be
clear standards of application in order to prevent police, prosecutors, and juries from subjectively
enforcing the law according to their discretion. 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983). The CPPA lacks
these clear standards of application and the phrases “appears to be” and “conveys the
impression,” give law enforcement officials the opportunity to subjectively exercise their
discretion. No formula can accurately calculate the relationship between the actual age of a
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person and the age that a person “appears to be.” Therefore, the CPPA permits the “arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement” that this Court warned about in Kolender.
1.

The reach of the CPPA is not limited to sexually explicit images that are
“virtually indistinguishable” from real children.

In the legislative history of the CPPA, Congress addressed the possibility that certain
types of technology could be used to create images that are “virtually indistinguishable” from
authentic photographs of actual minors engaging in such conduct. (J. A. 31.) Although such
Congressional concerns may have motivated the enactment of the CPPA, Petitioner erroneously
contends that Congress set a standard by which the fact-finder could determine whether an image
falls within the scope of the statute. (J.A. 31.) The standard used by juries is not the “virtually
distinguishable” standard and Petitioner has misconstrued the legislative history. Congress was
merely addressing the role of computer technology and the potential for production of realistic
computer images. However, the language of the statute encompasses both computer images as
well as all non-computer generated images
Even assuming that the government’s contention is valid and that juries will use a
“virtually indistinguishable” standard to determine whether an individual has violated the CPPA,
such a standard is still highly subjective. The phrase “virtually indistinguishable” would allow
juries to arbitrarily and discriminatorily enforce the statute because juries are subject to the same
influences as law enforcement. The various personalities and backgrounds of the jury members
will result in unexpected determinations of whether the image is “virtually indistinguishable”
from that of an actual child.
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2.

The scienter requirement does not remedy the violation of an individuars
due process rights.

The government erroneously contends that the CPPA’s scienter requirement saves the
statute because it forces the government to prove that the individual acquired or distributed the
child pornography because he believed that the sexual images were of children under 18 years
old. However, the scienter requirement does not rectify the violation of an individual’s due
process rights and permits the government to invade the individual’s privacy. Due Process rights
cannot be remedied after the fact and the government will also be permitted to conduct an
unfettered investigation of backgrounds and past histories.
3.

The affirmative defense is inadequate.

The affirmative defense is inadequate because it is unavailable to those charged with
possession and only sellers, producers, and distributors are able to use this affirmative defense.
Therefore, an individual who possesses lawful adult pornography may be convicted of
possession of child pornography because the affirmative defense is unavailable. Petitioner
contends that 18 U.S.C. § 2252(A)(d) provides a defense for those who are charged with
possession of child pornography.' However, this defense is likewise inadequate for three
reasons.
First, the defense only protects those who possessed less than three images and does not
specify the way in which the images must have come into possession. Therefore, an individual
who receives four e-mails containing images that “appear to be” or “convey the impression” of
minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct will be convicted of possession.

' 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(d) states than an individual may avoid conviction by demonstrating that he
(1) possessed fewer than three such images; and (2) promptly and in good faith destroyed or
reported the images to law enforcement.
25

Second, because the defense forces individuals to promptly and in good faith destroy the
images but does not define what “promptly” means, an individual who is unaware that he has
come into possession of images covered under the CPPA may be convicted for possession.
Third, requiring individuals to report the images to law enforcement places a heavy
burden on civilians to run the risk that they will be unjustly branded as a viewer of child
pornography.
Furthermore, the government’s contention that the scienter requirement and affirmative
defense save the statute ignores the fact that due process right are triggered prior to prosecution.
The exhaustive ordeal and negative stigma of an innocent person being known as a viewer of
child pornography is too great and is not fixed by an affirmative defense that is triggered after
the fact. The statute also provides no guarantees that the problem will be fixed. The
Constitution requires that individuals be provided adequate warning and notice of what action
will violate certain laws. Because the CPPA’s only safeguards are offered after an individual’s
due process rights have been violated, it violates the Constitution.
C.

The CPPA Has a Chilling Effect on Constitutionally Protected Speech.

The right to free speech is supremely precious. NAACP v. Button. 371 U.S. 415, 433
(1963). In Button, this Court addressed the strong possibility that vague laws will prevent people
from exercising their right to free speech. Id The threat of punishment is enough to frighten
people into surrendering their First Amendment rights. Id. at 433. When boundaries of
forbidden areas are not clearly defined, citizens err on the side of caution and sacrifice lawfully
permitted forms of free speech. Gravned v. City of Rockford. 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972). In
Reno V. ACLU. this Court held that the Communications Decency Act was void for vagueness
because the sanctions were too extreme. 521 U.S. at 871. The CDA was a criminal statute and
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had a penalty of two years in jail. 521 U.S. at 872. Fear of invoking such criminal sanctions
would prevent individuals from communicating lawful ideas and images. Id.
The CPPA’s criminal sanctions are far more severe than those of the CDA. Conviction
under the CPPA is a minimum of fifteen years in prison. Thus, the chilling effect discussed in
Reno is magnified in this case because the stakes are higher. The minimum fifteen year penalty
will prevent large numbers of people from exercising their Constitutional right to free speech.
Those who risk criminal sanctions in order to speak freely must defend their ideas under the
affirmative defense.
The CPPA*s affirmative defense contravenes the Congressional intent of the First
Amendment because it forces people to utilize their own resources. Individuals must hire
lawyers and fight a legal battle in order to employ the affirmative defense. The CPPA forces
individuals to satisfy a prerequisite before they can exercise their First Amendment rights. By
doing so, the CPPA changes the First Amendment and limits its freedoms to a select few. Under
the CPPA, only those who possess and are able to use their own resources are permitted to
exercise their First Amendment rights. Because only certain individuals are given the right to
speak freely, the marketplace of ideas is robbed of valuable contents.
CONCLUSION
By criminalizing the sexual depiction of adult or even artificial persons which “appear to
be” or “convey the impression” of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, Congress has
legislated in contravention of the First Amendment. No children are banned in the production or
possession of childless pornography, and thus the child-protective policy rationale underlying the
Ferber and Osborne decisions has been significantly undermined. Therefore, Congress is
prevented from enacting a content-based speech restriction upon non-obscene, childless
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pornography unless the Act is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling governmental interest.
Because the CPPA is not narrowly tailored to advance the compelling governmental interest of
protecting children from physical and psychological harm, it does not survive strict scrutiny.
Furthermore, the CPPA is invalid on overbreadth grounds because it prohibits an
intolerable amount of constitutionally protected speech. Because the scope of the Act is so
expansive, a substantial amount of valuable speech will be deterred. Therefore, this Court
should sever the offending provisions of the Act so as to tailor the CPPA to the identified social
need of preventing the exploitative use of real children.
Moreover, the CPPA is void for vagueness because it fails to define the prohibited
conduct such that a person of common intelligence can understand and encourages law
enforcement to arbitrarily and discriminatorily enforce the statute. The imprecise definition of
and relationship between the phrases “appears to be” and “conveys the impression” exposes the
Act to opposing constructions and subjective fact-finding.
For the foregoing reasons, Respondent respectfully requests that this Court AFFIRM the
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and find Sections
2256(8)(B) and (D) of the CPPA unconstitutional.
Respectfully submitted,^___

Counsel for Respondent
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APPENDIX A
18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) defines child pornography as:
Any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or
computer-generated image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic,
mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, where (B) such visual depiction is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct;
(D) such visual depiction is advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed in
such a manner that conveys the impression that the material is or contains a visual
depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.
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